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Article
Early Confucian Concept 
of Yi (议)and Deliberative 
Democracy
Sor-hoon Tan1
Abstract
Contributors to the debates about the compatibility of Confucianism and 
democracy and its implications for China’s democratization often adopt 
definitions of democracy that theories of deliberative democracy are critical 
of. Attention to deliberative democracy is timely given its importance 
in democratic discourses and recent experiments in “deliberative” or 
“consultative” democracy in China. Would Confucian understanding of 
political deliberation help or hinder deliberative democracy? This essay 
compares the concept of yi in the early Confucian texts with a contemporary 
concept of democratic deliberation. The differences between the concept of 
yi in early Confucian texts and the concept of democratic deliberation show 
that the presence of deliberation, even when they meet stringent norms, 
does not guarantee that the politics would be democratic. Rather, the 
political environment and processes must be democratized for deliberation 
to be democratic. This comparative study considers how the similarities 
between two concepts, and other aspects of Confucian philosophy might be 
deployed to close the gap between early Confucian view of ideal government 
and deliberative democracy. At the same time, it does not simply embrace 
all aspects of the chosen democratic theory, but argues that Confucian 
deliberative democracy may differ significantly, for example, in approaching 
politics from the perspective of a comprehensive ethical theory. In doing 
so, it offers a different conception of deliberative democracy and shows 
how the chosen theory is limited by certain assumptions specific to its own 
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context and that the understanding of deliberative democracy needs to be 
expanded and modified to approach genuine universalism.
Keywords
Confucianism, deliberation, Confucian politics
Democratic Aspirations in the Politics of 
Civilization1
There has been considerable talk of the need for political reforms to comple-
ment economic reforms in official statements from the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) top leaders, and a lively discourse about democracy in China in 
recent years. Claims by CCP and academics with close links to the Party 
about China’s democratization may be met with skepticism, but they testify 
to the rising popular demand for democracy, for ordinary Chinese citizens to 
have more say in political decisions and policies. Surveys conducted in the 
last two decades on Chinese political values and attitudes show increasing 
support for democracy: the 2001 World Values Survey in China show 96% 
agreeing that having a democratic political system is fairly good (75%) or 
very good (21%), although this is complicated by varying understanding of 
democracy, and fears and anxieties that undermine democracy. The CCP, 
seeking to handle the people’s democratic aspirations without ceding its 
supremacy and undermining China’s economic growth, has embarked on a 
series of political experiments in the past two decades to increase political 
participation at different levels of the political process, including elections at 
village and township levels. There is strong support among the population for 
the CCP’s leadership in developing democracy in China. Despite the belief 
prevalent among outside observers that political reforms have stagnated, a 
majority of the Chinese population (67%) are fairly satisfied (55%) or very 
satisfied (12%) with “the way democracy works” in China.2
While some Chinese, such as the signatories to Charter 08, aspire to the 
liberal democracies of the West, they are probably outnumbered by those 
who believe that China’s democratization should be on its own terms, with 
characteristically “Chinese” institutions, and if not completely new inven-
tions, these must be compatible with or even rooted in the distinctive charac-
teristics of Chinese culture. Nationalism, with different strands, has come to 
dominate both popular and intellectual Chinese discourses over the last two 
decades. Cultural nationalists often look to traditional Chinese culture, espe-
cially Confucianism, for inspiration when charting China’s future. Politically, 
they are often inclined towards neo-authoritarian thinking, due to 
Confucianism’s historical association with autocracy, which probably also 
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tempted the CCP to appropriate the Confucian tradition for its own political 
agenda.3 Others are critical of liberal democracy for its failings, especially in 
the United States of America, and believe that China has traditions that offer 
superior alternatives. Daniel A. Bell proposed a “Confucian” institutional 
alternative to liberal democracy, a bicameral legislature with a meritocrati-
cally selected upper house of “virtue and talent” and a democratically elected 
lower house.4 He and Jiang Qing also presented a “Confucian Constitution” 
with a tripartite government based on three sources of political legitimacy as 
an alternative to the duo of authoritarianism and democracy.5
Whatever the historical associations because of its adoption as state ortho-
doxy by various imperial regimes, Confucianism as a philosophy is not inher-
ently anti-liberal or anti-democratic, and philosophical attempts to reconcile 
Confucianism with democracy in some form goes back more than a century. 
Against the May Fourth attacks on Confucianism, blaming it for China’s 
backwardness and its failure to develop science and democracy, modern neo-
Confucians such as Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan offered creative transfor-
mations of Confucianism to reconcile it with modernity, in particular with 
science and democracy.6 William de Bary maintained that there was a “liberal 
tradition” in China.7 According to Tu Wei-ming, liberal democracy provides 
the best way to realize Confucian ethical pursuits.8 Sor-hoon Tan reconstructs 
a Deweyan form of Confucian democracy that resists individualism of auton-
omous selves often associated with liberalism in favor of Dewey’s social 
liberal conception of democracy as the idea of community without submerg-
ing individuality in holistic collectivism.9 Sungmoon Kim argues persua-
sively against the various forms of Confucian meritocracy offered either as 
constraints on or opposition to democracy, in favor of a form of pluralistic 
Confucian democracy with greater emphasis on individual political auton-
omy and more faith in democratic participation.10
Contributors to this lively discourse often adopt definitions of democracy 
that theories of deliberative democracy are critical of. Attention to delibera-
tive democracy is timely given its importance in democratic discourses and 
recent experiments in “deliberative” or “consultative” democracy in China. 
Baogang He and Mark Warren’s study shows that deliberative politics in 
China, combining non-inclusive power and persuasion-based influence, is 
authoritarian rather than democratic.11 One question is whether this is due to 
the continued influence of Confucianism. Would Confucian understanding of 
political deliberation help or hinder deliberative democracy? This essay seeks 
to answer these questions by comparing the concept of yi in the early 
Confucian texts with contemporary concepts of democratic deliberation. 
Confucianism is a very complex tradition of both thought and practice that 
has evolved over more than two millennia. This study will focus on texts 
Tan 85
from the pre-Qin period (before the unification of China in 221 BCE) that, 
taken together, are widely accepted as the earliest source of Confucian phi-
losophy: the Analects, the Mencius, the Xunzi, andthe Confucian Classics—
the Changes,the Odes,the Documents,the three Rites cannons, and the Zuo 
Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals.12
In the context of Andrew March’s discussion of comparative political the-
ory, this study does not assume that comparative political theory is most 
coherent and interesting only when it engages in first-order evaluation of the 
competing ideas, doctrines, and norms from distinct and at least semi-auton-
omous traditions.13 Whether or not it deserves the description of comparative 
political theory, it is a deliberate intervention in the above-mentioned politics 
of civilization. Although it aims to determine whether and how Confucianism 
might support deliberative democracy today, its concern is not primarily 
rehabilitative. There is no need to render Confucianism less alien to those 
from other traditions given the already considerable and still growing litera-
ture showing similarities between Confucianism and various Western phi-
losophies. It is more interested in contributing to the construction of 
democratic alternatives to societies with Confucian legacies. Its modest scope 
does not encompass all the other laudable possibilities of explanatory-inter-
pretative, epistemic,global-democratic, and critical-transformative compara-
tive theorizing mentioned by March.
Deliberation (yi 议) in Early Confucian Texts
In China’s current political vocabulary, “yi议” is used in “deliberating in 
politics,” often coupled with “participating in politics.” The term includes 
any kind of verbal exchange, from loose talk about politics in various set-
tings to more stringently defined “deliberation” in which reasoning or think-
ing is employed in collective decision making of official forums. The term 
appears in early Confucian texts with a range of meanings; some usages 
have nothing to do with politics or government. In two cases in the Zuo 
Commentary, it means “measuring” or “according to” some kind of distance 
in descriptions about construction work.14 An ode celebrating the comple-
tion and dedication of a palace describes the daughters born to the occupant 
as living a carefree life in which the only matters requiring yi pertained to 
food and drink.
It will be theirs neither to do wrong nor to do good.
Only about the spirits and the food will they have to think,
And to cause no sorrow to their parents.15
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The Ceremonials, one of the Rites cannons, records a sacrificial rite requiring 
yi in selecting one of the guests to assist the impersonator of the dead.16
According to the above usages, yi involves some thought or choice. 
Usually the criteria for choice are ethical or imply some justification. The 
earliest Chinese dictionary glosses yi as “speech that attains the suitable, 
proper, or right” and the way it is written links it with “appropriateness,” 
which is one of the virtues central to Confucian ethics.17 Xunzi makes the 
ethical standards required of yi explicit.
As a matter of general principle, in deliberations it is necessary to establish 
high standards of correctness, for only then may the validity of an argument be 
determined. If there are no such high standards of correctness, then truth and 
falsity cannot be separated and discriminations and disputes cannot be settled.18
The sense of yi as deliberation to reach the right judgment by arguments 
based on virtue is found in a narrative in the Zuo Commentary.Three indi-
viduals were contenders for the ownership of a territory after its owner died. 
The claim of one on historical grounds was disputed by the other two on the 
basis that, given so much subsequent divisions and transfers of territories, it 
was well nigh impossible to establish on historical grounds who had the right 
to rule any of them. Eventually all three voluntarily abandoned their claims 
because they felt bound by what they came to accept as the correct yi, a judg-
ment rendered on the basis of their virtue.19
The normative connotations of some usages notwithstanding, yi in politi-
cal contexts can mean idle talk, even false and pernicious opinions.
Some indulge long in pleasure and drinking,
And some are miserable, in apprehension of blame;
Some, at home and abroad, pass critical remarks,
And some have everything to do.20
This ode by a soldier complaining about inequity in official assignments 
implies that, rather than an activity concerned with virtue, yi is idle talk at 
the expense of positive contribution to the state. This also seems to be the 
meaning of yi in Analects 16.2. “When the way prevails in the world, the 
common people do not debate affairs of the state.”21 The people’s yi about 
politics may be considered “idle” because they were not responsible for gov-
erning. This is a view also implied in the only occurrence of yi in the 
Mencius.
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No sage kings have appeared since then. Feudal lords do as they please; people 
with no official position uninhibitedly expressing their views, and the words of 
Yang Chu and Mo Ti fill the Empire.22
The Xunzi also uses yi with negative meanings of false opinions and idle, 
pernicious talk. Xunzi associates such yi that fails to be excellent with fail-
ures of government.23 Conversely, deliberating with virtue is crucial to good 
government.
When its plowmen take pleasure in the fields, when its fighting knights are 
comfortable with adversity, when its minor officials are devoted to law, when 
its court exalts ritual principles, when its high-ranking officials harmoniously 
engage in deliberations—this state is definitely well-governed.24
A ruler who “is fond of discussions and deliberations, is sure to be adept at 
laying plans.”25Yi is important in judicial contexts, ensuring that laws are 
“executed without excesses”; without yi, “points not explicitly covered are 
certain to be left unresolved.”26 These passages are reminiscent of descrip-
tions of judicial offices in the Zhou Rites, the Rites cannon listing various 
bureaucratic functions of the Zhou dynasty. In determining punishments, the 
minor magistrate deliberated on various factors. Other officials involved in 
adjudicating litigations, crime, and punishment also deliberated, especially 
when the application of existing statutes was not clear or straightforward, and 
therefore discussion was required in a specific case among relevant officials 
to judge what was right and appropriate, or fitted the statute in question.27
Loosely understood as thought and discussions aimed at evaluation or 
choice, yi could have positive or negative effects in politics and government. 
From the Confucian perspective, the outcome depends on the motivation and 
ethical qualities of those deliberating. Confucius refused to deliberate with 
those who allowed materialistic desires to distract them from the pursuit of 
the ethical life. “Those scholar-apprentices who, having set their purposes on 
walking the way, are ashamed of rude clothing and coarse food, are not worth 
engaging in discussion.”28 Without the appropriate orientation, deliberation 
becomes cunning thinking resulting in choice devoid of ethical merit. 
Deliberation with ethical orientation is part of learning to become an exem-
plary person and part of the understanding of a sage.29 It is therefore impor-
tant that the object of yi itself is ethical. The Changes, which originated as a 
divination manual and is consulted for grasping the way the world changes 
and how to conduct oneself amid these changes for the best effect, mentions 
yi only once: “the exemplary person/superior person . . . deliberates on virtue 
and conduct.”30 The Rites Records mentions how the exemplary person 
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“deliberates on the way” to the best of his own ability but does not expect the 
same of the common people who must be regulated by laws.31
Injunctions in the Rites Records suggest that only certain people are quali-
fied to deliberate on certain matters, and deliberation is not an activity appro-
priate for all occasions. It describes Confucius cautioning his audience “not 
to discuss/deliberate on rites lightly,” probably because serious study and 
practice are required before one is qualified to do so.32 The text at one point 
limits deliberation on the rites to “the Son of Heaven,” recalling Analects 
16.2, “When the way prevails in the world, rites, music, and punitive cam-
paigns are initiated by the Son of Heaven.”33Yi is not appropriate when one is 
in mourning. For the heaviest mourning, the mourner responds to others 
without conversing with them; the next lower level of mourning, the mourner 
answers verbally without talking more than necessary; another level down, 
the mourner talks more freely but does not engage in deliberation or discus-
sion; only the lightest forms of mourning for distant relatives allow mourners 
to engage in deliberation but not to listen to music. According to Zheng Xuan, 
deliberation here refers to discussions critical of current affairs.34 The mean-
ing of yi here may be the negative one of idle talk, which would be inappro-
priate during mourning. However, the ritual exclusion of deliberation during 
mourning does not necessarily devalue it. The activity may be inappropriate 
because the mourner’s grief should preclude his focusing on anything else; 
engaging in discussions, especially of political matters, is evidence of insuf-
ficient grief, not because deliberation is necessarily trivial or frivolous, or 
inherently bad, but because politics takes one’s mind away from the personal 
grieving. This ritual abstention from political deliberation was supposed to 
apply not only to the common people discussing politics, but also to govern-
ment officials and even the ruler himself engaging in deliberation that is a 
legitimate part of government.35
The Rites Record stipulates that deliberation on official or public matters 
must not be conducted in private. Han dynasty scholar Zheng Xuan com-
mented that this is to avoid the suspicion of wrongdoing. In Qing dynasty 
commentator Sun Xidan’s opinion, this is to avoid abuse of power by a few 
individuals acting in secret for private gain; Sun added that this reasoning 
applies also to Analects 13.14. According to Sun, Confucius dismissed the 
discussion between Ranyou and the head of the Ji clan as being about “affairs 
of state” because it was conducted in private.36 This seems to recognize that 
matters of concern to the people and official duties should be open to public 
scrutiny, if for no other reason than avoiding secret “private” deals that might 
benefit a selfish minority against the people’s interests. It is misleading to 
reify any dualistic opposition between private and public in Chinese thought. 
The terms gong and si are often used quite effectively to translate “public” 
Tan 89
and “private,” contrasted with each other without sharing the Western philo-
sophical baggage of the public-private divide. Gong means both “official” 
and “public,” while si often means “selfish” as well as “private.”37
In the Documents, the only use of yi occurs in the record of a Zhou King’s 
exhortation to his officers to learn from the ancients in their deliberation; it 
also refers to the incompatibility between public office and selfishness.
By your public feeling extinguish all selfish aims, and the people will have 
confidence in you and be gladly obedient.
Study antiquity in order to enter on your offices. By deliberating on affairs, 
determine by the help of such study, and your arts of government will be free 
from error.38
The phrase using yi in this passage reappears in the Zuo Commentary, in a 
narrativeof Shu Xiang admonishing Zi Chan of Zheng for casting tripods 
with descriptions of crimes and punishments.39 This is considered a departure 
from the practice of the ancient kings who “deliberated on [all the circum-
stances], and determined [on the punishment of crimes]” without making 
“laws of punishment lest it should give rise to a contentious spirit among the 
people.”40 Shu Xiang seemed to think that if laws were clearly specified and 
made public, litigiousness would undermine good government.
When the people know what the exact laws are, they do not stand in awe of 
their superiors. They also come to have a contentious spirit, and make their 
appeal to the express words, hoping peradventure to be successful in their 
arguments. They can no longer be managed.41
Shu Xiang did not describe the people’s arguments to protect their own 
selfish interests in litigations as yi and clearly did not consider them capable 
of yi that contributed to good government. Zi Chan, on a different occasion, 
appears to have a higher opinion of the common people and the kind of yi 
they are capable of. It was suggested to Zi Chan when he was minister of 
Zheng that village schools be destroyed because someone had wandered into 
one such school and fell to “discoursing about the conduct of government.” 
Zi Chan replied,
“Why do so? If people retire morning and evening, and pass their judgment on 
the conduct of government, as good or bad, I will do what they approve of, and 
I will alter what they condemn; — they are my teachers. On what grounds 
should we destroy [those schools]?42
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Some might wonder to what extent Zi Chan’s accommodating attitude to the 
people’s criticisms of government policies and actions is accepted by 
Confucians, since he is presented earlier as the object of Confucian criti-
cism.43 The narrative about Zi Chan’s defense of the village schools ends 
with Confucius’s judgment of Zi Chan as a benevolent person. The balance 
of evidence across the range of early texts shows more Confucian approba-
tion than disapproval of Zi Chan.44
The above survey of yi in the early Confucian texts shows that deliberation 
loosely understood as discussion and thought aimed at evaluation or choice, 
even though it need not result in definitive evaluation or actual choice, is an 
acknowledged activity with varied political impact. Early Confucian ideal 
incorporates deliberation into the political process by emphasizing its norma-
tive requirements and highlighting how failing the ethical demands on delib-
eration would bring disasters to individuals and states. To meet its normative 
requirements, deliberation tends to become limited to persons who possess 
ethical qualities and are entrusted with social or political responsibilities. 
Deliberation appears to be the legitimate activity only of the ethically accom-
plished (exemplary persons and sages) or the political elite (rulers, ministers, 
magistrates).45 The only exception is Zi Chan’s defense of people discussing 
the government’s performance, which apparently contrasts sharply with the 
association of the same phenomenon with problematic governance in 
Analects 16.2. One could reconcile them by reading the latter as referring to 
people discussing affairs of state as a sign or the result rather than the cause 
of bad government. If there were good government and the people were con-
tent, there would be no need for such discussion; this is consistent with a less 
than ideal government being able to learn from such discussion when it 
occurs.
The village school narrative notwithstanding, the survey of yi in early 
Confucian texts shows no straight forward endorsement of democratic delib-
eration. Insofar as there was deliberative politics in the political life depicted 
in those texts, deliberation was mostly carried out in undemocratic environ-
ments with a tendency to exclude the common people. Those concerned with 
recovering traditional thought and practices might take this as support for 
authoritarian deliberation in contemporary Chinese politics. Daniel A. Bell 
argues that elite deliberative institutions have special appeal in East Asia 
because of Confucian influence, which poses cultural limits to democratic 
deliberation. However, it is questionable whether contemporary authoritarian 
deliberation lives up to the Confucian normative requirements; Bell himself 
acknowledges that East Asian societies face the challenge of combining the 
benefits of “rule by a talented and public-spirited elite with the democratic 
virtues of accountability, publicity, and participation.”46 How different is 
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early Confucian understanding of yi from the concept of deliberation in con-
temporary democratic theories?
Yi and Contemporary Democratic Deliberation
Many who want rule by the people are dissatisfied with the political system 
of public offices filled by periodic elections, even while they recognize that 
direct democracy in which everyone decides on everything is impractical. 
Some are critical of liberal democracy’s over-reliance on the legalistic regime 
of fundamental rights and principles of justice, at the expense of democratic 
resolution of moral disagreements.47 Theorists of deliberative democracy 
argue that inclusive public deliberation offers people more meaningful and 
more frequent participation in matters concerning them; as a decision-mak-
ing procedure, deliberation is capable of delivering better results than aggre-
gation of preferences through voting, interest groups bargaining, rights 
litigation, or other alternatives in actual democracies. There is however no 
consensus on the meaning of “deliberation.” The concept stretches from any 
kind of communication to consensus aiming rational discourse defined by 
Habermasian ideal communicative situation, just as yi in early Confucian 
texts stretches from mere expression of opinions to arguments and judgments 
based on virtue.48 Both contemporary theories of deliberative democracy and 
early Confucian texts show concern about normative standards of delibera-
tion and yi respectively insofar as these concepts play a role in good 
government.
In contemporary debates about deliberative democracy, theorists propose 
various criteria for democratic deliberation, such as reciprocity, publicity, 
accountability, freedom and equality, reason, aim at consensus, and focus on 
the common good.49 Jane Mansbridge advocates a “deliberative system” that 
includes not only deliberation by formal and informal representatives, 
between constituents and representatives in designated public forums and 
politically oriented organizations, discussions in media and among political 
activists, but also “everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the 
public ought to discuss.”50 Although she is critical of some aspects of norma-
tive standards imposed by other theorists, she acknowledges the need for 
standards of good deliberation that apply to both formal assemblies and more 
loosely to “everyday talk.” The normative standards of what counts as good 
deliberation in deliberative democracy are determined by conceptions of 
democratic legitimacy, by considerations of what make democracy a desir-
able form of government. Without the same commitment to democracy, early 
Confucianism has different standards for yi that are based on its own concep-
tion of ideal government. Comparing the two sets of standards will illuminate 
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the similarities and differences between early Confucian ideal of government 
and democracy and show us whether it is possible to close the gap between 
the two, if one wishes to universalize democracy. Given limited space, this 
comparison will only look at the requirements of democratic deliberation in 
Gutmann and Thompson’s theory.
Beginning with the narrative most accommodating of democratic partici-
pation, one might ask why Zi Chan favored giving space to the people to 
deliberate, debate, or simply pass critical remarks about government conduct. 
He believed that government could learn about what the people considered 
good or bad, and adjust their policies and actions accordingly. This assumes 
that a government that gives people what they want and act in a manner 
approved by the people is a better government. Although it does not advocate 
rule by the people, it defies the common supposition that Confucians believe 
in rule by sages who always know what is best for the people, better than the 
people themselves; it opens the way to a politics that is more “discursive, 
educational, oriented to truly public interests, and needful of active citizen-
ship.”51 Without rejecting the ideal of sage-kings, Zi Chan recognized that 
actual governments suffer from “bounded” rationality, “the fact that our 
imaginations and calculating abilities are limited and fallible.”52 This recog-
nition leads to epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy: compared 
with an individual decision maker or other political decision-making process, 
public deliberation is more likely to yield, if not exactly the “right answer,” 
then at least the “better answer” to the practical questions of politics, for 
example, based on an understanding of decision making as a process in which 
beliefs about the right action or policy are adjusted in the light of evidence 
provided by the beliefs of others.53
Nor is Zi Chan unusual among the early Chinese in acknowledging that 
actual governments are not sages and admitting a need to broaden participa-
tion, at least through rulers listening to good advice in various deliberative 
situations. The same sentiments underlie Mencius’s delight at the prospect of 
Yue Zhengzi taking political office in Lu because of the latter’s fondness for 
the good.
If a man is truly drawn to the good, then, within the Four Seas, men will come, 
thinking nothing of the distance of a thousand li, to bring to his notice what is 
good. On the other hand, if he is not drawn to the good, then men will say of 
him, “He seems to say ‘I know it all.’” The way one says “I know it all” with 
its accompanying look of complacence will repel men a thousand li away.54
No matter how experienced, knowledgeable, or well informed those in office, 
their knowledge alone would not be enough for good government. Knowledge 
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is distributed throughout the population, and those who would seek and invite 
other’s knowledge out of a “fondness for the good” would govern better than 
those who believe themselves to be omniscient.
Confucius also emphasized the danger of rulers who do not admit their 
own epistemic and ethical limitations.
“Is there any one saying that can ruin a state?” Duke Ding asked. “A saying 
itself cannot have such effect,” replied Confucius, “but there is the saying, ‘I 
find little pleasure in ruling, save that no one will take exception to what I say.’ 
If what one has to say is efficacious and no one takes exception, fine indeed. 
But if what one has to say is not efficacious and no one takes exception, is this 
not close to a saying ruining a state?”55
Rather than the complete obedience by subordinates expected of authoritar-
ian regimes, Xunzi advocated that ministers who “follow the way and not the 
lord” should oppose and remonstrate against rulers whose inadequacies 
endanger the state.56 These textual resources acknowledging the fallibility of 
actual governments and the benefits to be gained from encouraging free 
expression and dissenting views, although usually limited to elite interactions 
in the early Confucian texts, could be extended, within the context of expand-
ing the relevance of the Confucian tradition to contemporary life, to support 
public deliberation for better achievement of the common good.
Publicity of Deliberation
To early Confucians, selfishness is a frequent obstacle to good government 
and its elimination is a normative requirement of yi. We see in the Zuo 
Commentary story about the fight over territory, the “correct yi” that resolved 
the matter is based on the virtuous contenders surrendering their selfish inter-
ests. The Documents acknowledges that popular support for government 
depends on the latter’s riding itself of “selfish aims.” Guarding against the 
selfish motives also seems to be the concern of the Rites Record’s injunction 
against discussing official matters in private. The latter resonates with con-
temporary calls for more transparency in government processes and the prin-
ciple of publicity in theories of deliberative democracy. Gutmann and 
Thompson cite Jeremy Bentham, that “publicity is essential to ensure that 
government promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number” by act-
ing as “a mechanism to make the self-interest of officials coincide with the 
general interest.”57 Combined with the village school narrative, we might 
argue that this awareness that publicity helps to prevent self-interest defeat-
ing general interest gives Confucians a reason to encourage citizens to delib-
erate publicly about government policy.
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Reciprocity, publicity, and accountability are three principles implied by 
“the disposition to seek mutually justifiable reasons,” which Gutmann and 
Thompson identify as the core of deliberation.58 The village school narrative 
by itself is inadequate as an argument for public deliberation. Although Zi 
Chan might implicitly encourage people to debate government conduct so he 
could learn from them, he did not engage them by offering them reasons for 
the government conduct they were approving or criticizing. Nor does the 
ritual injunction against private discussion of official affairs stipulate that 
officials should offer reasons acceptable to those affected by official policies. 
Looking beyond passages in which yi occurs, we find in the Documents a 
record of an event in which a Shang dynasty ruler Pan Geng apparently 
offered public justifications for his intended move of the capital to Yin. This 
decision had significant impact on his subjects and met with some initial 
resistance. Pan Geng “appealed to all the discontented,” first citing that the 
old capital was no longer viable.59 He went on to give reasons that, although 
dubious to today’s audience, would carry considerable weight with his audi-
ence: the outcome of divination on the matter, and how the move followed a 
tradition established by earlier rulers. He wanted “to induce a sincere acqui-
escence in the measure.”60 He admonished his ministers, “Let none of you 
dare to suppress the remonstrances of the poorer people.”61 He called on 
those who opposed him to “put away [their] selfish thoughts.”62 This docu-
ment seems to offer us an example of public deliberation that seeks to be 
inclusive and offers reasons for a political act that aims to be mutually 
justifiable.
Reciprocity versus Impartiality
Unfortunately, the “Pan Geng” is rather one-sided, failing to capture the 
voices and views of his subjects, and at one point lapses into autocratic 
threats. “If there be bad and unprincipled men, precipitously or carelessly 
disrespectful to my orders, and taking advantage of this brief season to play 
the part of villains or traitors, I will cut off their noses, or utterly exterminate 
them.”63 Are these threats part of the justifiable enforcement of a decision 
implemented after adequate public deliberation or do they point to a lack of 
mutual respect for differing opinions, and therefore a failure to meet Gutmann 
and Thompson’s extended principle of reciprocity? Deliberation in a democ-
racy requires civic integrity and civic magnanimity. Civic integrity means 
that participants must affirm the moral status of their political positions—
being consistent in speech, between speech and action, and accepting the 
broader implications of principles presupposed by one’s moral positions. 
Civic magnanimity requires participants to acknowledge the moral status of 
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the positions they oppose. Beyond acknowledgment in speech, participants 
must be open minded, maintaining the possibility of being convinced of the 
moral merits of opposing views, and they should practice “economy of moral 
disagreement” by minimizing rejection of opposing views.64
Whether Pan Geng’s moral condemnation of those who continued to 
oppose him shows a lack of civic magnanimity depends on the nature of his 
opponents’ opposition. The textual evidence is inconclusive as to whether we 
have a case of reasonable moral disagreement of the kind that demands 
mutual respect. It is unclear whether the rejected “selfish thoughts” referred 
to the kind of reasons based on economic and social status that the principle 
of reciprocity would exclude or if the rejection demanded that everyone sup-
pressed and disregarded his or her personal projects and partial perspectives 
and be motivated only by altruism. The mention of including “the poorer 
people” supports the former reading; but the general tenor of Pan Geng’s 
condemnation of those who opposed him leans towards the latter reading, 
which means that his offer of reasons to his people is an example not of reci-
procity in democratic deliberation but of the principle of impartiality, that is, 
a demonstration that the intended action is universally justifiable from the 
perspective of a comprehensive view.
There is insufficient evidence for thinking that early Confucians believe 
that policies and political decisions are legitimated by deliberation based on 
mutually justifiable reasons. It is more likely that their view of political legiti-
macy is based on a comprehensive view of how human beings should live, 
and as part of that, how those in government positions should discharge their 
responsibilities. The criticisms of selfishness were made from an ethics that 
amounts to a comprehensive doctrine, rather than merely based on selfish 
reasons not being mutually justifiable. This is incompatible with Gutmann 
and Thompson’s theory of deliberative democracy. To reconcile early 
Confucianism with deliberative democracy, we need to defend deliberation 
as an ideal form of political participation without insisting on fundamental 
moral disagreement and the kind of mutual respect that views those who 
oppose us as holding reasonable moral views. I contend that an admission of 
fallibility is enough for accommodating others’ views to the extent that we 
believe them to hold those views sincerely as moral views, even though we 
believe them to be wrong, where accommodation means refraining from 
coercing them to act against their own beliefs or suppressing their expression 
of them. Confucianism approaches politics from the perspective of a compre-
hensive ethical doctrine but it is not a doctrine that demands conversion of all 
by any means possible. It would reject the claim that a Confucian sage could 
legitimately coerce others in order to make them into Confucians and there-
fore live better lives and realize the ideal Confucian polity. It is possible for 
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Confucians to support deliberative democracy because, in addition to the 
acknowledgment of fallibility of actual governments discussed above, early 
Confucian texts also emphasize that one learns to live the Confucian way of 
life only with voluntary commitment; in other words, “conversion” to its 
comprehensive doctrine cannot succeed by coercion.
Confucian Accountability and Deliberative Accountability
“In a deliberative forum, each is accountable to all.”65 Gutmann and 
Thompson’s principle of accountability is absent in early Confucian texts. 
What legitimizes a policy or political decision for Confucians is not the pro-
cess of officials or citizens justifying it to those bound or affected by it. This 
does not mean that there is no concept of accountability in early Confucianism. 
Governments were accountable in that their actions had consequences for 
their tenure. While the people could not vote their rulers out of power, their 
love or hatred for a government strengthened or weakened a state. Popular 
support mattered to rulers even without a democratic political system.
The lord is the boat; his subjects the water. It is the water that sustains the boat, 
and it is the water that capsizes the boat.66
The lack of democratic mechanisms to remove unpopular governments 
peacefully does mean that only in extreme cases would a regime be toppled 
and a ruler actually removed from office. In Chinese history, removal of gov-
ernments often required nothing short of armed rebellions and usually meant 
death of the deposed ruler.
According to the early Confucian texts, a good government is a govern-
ment for the people. To avoid being “capsized” by the people, a ruler must 
employ the talented and virtuous in his government, reward those who uphold 
ritual and ethical norms, punish those who use their talents in “conduct 
opposed to what is proper to the occasion,” look after the people, ensure that 
even the worst off in society have “employment adequate to feed and clothe 
themselves so that all are included and not even one of them is overlooked.”67 
Mencius ranked the people as a government’s first priority, ahead of the 
state’s independence and the ruler; the government of a true king is focused 
on the people’s welfare and education.68 We can infer from this that early 
Confucians do view governments as being accountable for the well-being of 
the people, but it is questionable whether this also means being accountable 
to the people, given that there is no systematic popular participation in the 
process by which a ruler or government came to power or left that position. 
In early Confucian texts, the most common concept of political legitimacy is 
“the mandate of heaven,” which implies that a ruler is accountable to heaven.
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The Mencius brings the people into the process of legitimate succession to 
the throne. In explaining what he meant when he said that heaven, and not 
Yao, gave Shun the empire, Mencius cited the Documents, “Heaven sees with 
the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the ears of its people.”69 This sug-
gests the possibility that being accountable to heaven may mean the same 
thing as being accountable to the people.70 However, the people do not seem 
to be any more articulate than heaven, which “does not speak but reveals 
itself through its acts and deeds.” The people do not give voice to heaven; 
they do not even seem to have their own voice but, like heaven, only reveal 
their will through their acts and deeds. “When he was put in charge of affairs, 
they were kept in order and the people were content. This showed that the 
people accepted him.” If being accountable to someone in deliberation means 
giving reasons that the person could accept, and responding to that person’s 
criticisms with mutual respect, then the early Confucian texts do not give us 
deliberative accountability.
The concept of accountability implicit in early Confucian political thought 
is not a matter of who is obligated to give reasons and to whom reasons 
should be given. Instead it has to do with discharging one’s responsibilities 
according to one’s position and living up to the ethical norms that govern the 
responsibilities of that position. One’s position is defined viz-a-viz others—
government and the governed—one’s failure or success in discharging one’s 
responsibilities towards them affects their well-being and they respond to 
one’s actions. Speech has no primary importance in this interaction. Though 
different from deliberative accountability, this early Confucian concept of 
accountability based on relational positions is not irrelevant to yi. It defines 
what it means to deliberate with accountability, or responsibly, in the early 
Confucian context. Mencius criticized the “uninhibited yi” of those “with no 
official positions,” only the “son of heaven” can legitimately deliberate about 
rituals, and the people, probably because they have no official positions, do 
not deliberate about affairs of the state when “the way prevails in the world.” 
Yi is legitimate when it corresponds to the responsibilities of one’s position.
Linking accountability and deliberative legitimacy to positions tends to be 
socially conservative and elitist if one takes those positions as given by pre-
vailing social structure. Such tendencies lead to obfuscation between 
Confucian rule by virtue and elite rule, unless one takes care to distinguish 
between rightful position and de factoposition. The “son of heaven” who 
should deliberate on rites refers not to just any actual ruler but someone who 
has the “mandate of heaven,” that is a legitimate ruler who occupies the 
throne because of his virtue. Those who hold offices without the requisite 
virtues do so under false pretense.71 To resist anti-democratic reading of 
Confucianism, it is necessary to separate clearly the belief that the virtuous 
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should be appointed to political office or occupy other superior positions, to 
which Confucians are philosophically committed to, and the unjustified 
assumption that those occupying official or superior positions, which might 
not have been acquired through ethical means, are therefore superior in virtue 
or talent. Accountability in deliberation from the early Confucian perspective 
means that one’s deliberation should be limited to the responsibilities of one’s 
rightful position.
Confucius said, “Do not plan the policies of an office you do not hold.”72 
Zeng Zi interpreted this as “The thoughts of exemplary persons do not wan-
der beyond their position.” Ames and Rosemont comment on this, “Words 
are cheap—if you have the position, you have the responsibility.”73 It could 
be justifiable to tie accountability to positions even when the occupants may 
not have the virtue to go with it. One can contextualize Confucius’ admoni-
tion with the dangers of abuse when power is exercised by those without the 
authority attached to specific offices—this is an endemic problem in Chinese 
history from the influence over the emperors of their wives, concubines, and 
relatives to that of eunuchs; and officials at various levels failed at their jobs 
not only from incompetence, but sometimes also from acting on the advice or 
under the influence of close associates. When someone holds an official posi-
tion, he or she is responsible for his or her actions in office, and these actions 
should be visible to others who could then hold them accountable. If perfor-
mance fails to meet the relevant standards, one way of holding the person 
accountable is to remove them from office. Whereas one who wields influ-
ence behind the scenes cannot be held accountable in this way even if others 
come to know their actions. The risk of abuse of power by usurpers, people 
who determine the course of politics without being authorized to do so, was 
taken so seriously by Confucius that he emphasized the need for the exem-
plary person to set an example of not resorting to acting without official 
authority, even if such a person could do a better job than the actual office 
holder.
Can the constraints of early Confucian concept of accountability on delib-
eration be rendered more democratic? Requiring that people deliberate within 
the responsibilities of their positions, even when these are held legitimately, 
has anti-democratic implications if the relevant positions include only those 
occupied by a minority, for example, government positions. For the early 
Confucian concept of accountability to be compatible with democratic delib-
eration, it must be possible for everyone legitimately to occupy a position 
with responsibility for political matters requiring deliberation. An obvious 
position is that of a citizen; every member of a polity is a citizen and no other 
qualification (virtue or talent) is required for participation in deliberation. 
The risk of yi among citizens being idle and including false or pernicious 
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views will always be present, but it does not justify excluding those whom 
one believes to be guilty of such negative yi. Rather, it means that Confucians 
must approach yi as a learning process, where one is open to learning from 
others, but also takes on the responsibility of “teaching” others through delib-
eration by offering them alternatives we believe to be better and persuading 
them to change their views and actions. This view of yi as a learning process-
moves Confucians closer to deliberative accountability of participants offer-
ing one another mutually justifiable reasons.
While early Confucian texts do not discuss citizenship, contemporary 
scholars have argued for conceptions of Confucian citizenship.74 Some may 
find the idea of citizenship too abstract and the relationship it invokes too 
impersonal for the Confucian ethical framework. Another approach that gives 
more weight to Confucian preference for particularistic relationships is to 
consider that every person find themselves in relationships—family, neigh-
bors, colleagues at work, and various kinds of organizations—in which arise 
“matters that the public ought to discuss.”75 Involvement in these relation-
ships means occupying positions with responsibility for political matters on 
which one should deliberate with others with similar responsibility in those 
particular relationships. This is consistent with the Confucian view that per-
sonal cultivation that is expected of every person goes hand in hand with 
participation in community.76 One’s ethical personality grows with one’s con-
tribution to others’ personal cultivation and thereby to the flourishing of com-
munity. Such contribution includes political participation as Confucians 
subsumed political life under their broad understanding of ethical life.
For Confucians, political order involves more than the official govern-
ment: it is about everyone doing what is right and proper in whatever social 
contexts one finds oneself, beginning from the most intimate and probably 
universal social group, the family.77 If a Confucian cannot or chooses not to 
serve in government, she could still contribute to political order by doing 
what is right and proper in her own situations, from family and personal rela-
tions, to workplace, to local community, to today’s national or transnational 
non-governmental organizations; this is consistent with a participatory con-
ception of democracy that locates participation not only in national electoral 
politics but in local contexts where people deliberate on matters with public 
import. In every context where there is something the public ought to discuss, 
anyone who has something to contribute to the topic for discussion occupies 
a position with the responsibility of deliberation, for which she is account-
able. Although she may not be directly accountable to everyone who would 
be affected by the result of the discussion, she is accountable for the result, 
whether or not it contributes to the flourishing of the community and its 
members, and thereby she is indirectly accountable to the community, and to 
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all members who are affected by the result of deliberation. This indirect 
accountability can be transformed into direct deliberative accountability if 
Confucians recognize that the impact of the result of any deliberation on oth-
ers is not self evident, and admission of fallibility of one’s own assessment 
means opening the evaluation of the deliberative result to others, especially 
those who are affected by the result; such engagement would require that one 
offers reasons for one’s views that others can accept.78
Conclusion
There are many theories of deliberative democracy, with different normative 
constraints on deliberation, and space limit allows exploration of only some 
aspects of deliberation in one such theory in a comparison with the concept 
of yi in early Confucian texts that constitute an authoritative source of 
Confucian ideas. This limited comparison shows that trying to rehabilitate 
early Confucianism would be procrustean if that means showing that there is 
already some form of deliberative democracy in the early Confucian texts. 
The differences between the concept of yi in early Confucian texts and the 
concept of democratic deliberation show that the presence of deliberation, 
even when they meet stringent norms, does not guarantee that the politics 
would be democratic. Rather, the political environment and processes must 
be democratized for deliberation to be democratic.
This comparative study is critical of the elitist and antidemocratic tenden-
cies in the early Confucian texts and tries to reconstruct Confucianism by 
leveraging on ideas in those texts that are friendlier to democracy. It is 
engaged political theorizing that considers how the similarities between two 
concepts, and other aspects of Confucian philosophy might be deployed to 
close the gap between early Confucian view of ideal government and delib-
erative democracy. At the same time, it does not simply embrace all aspects 
of the chosen democratic theory, but argues that Confucian deliberative 
democracy may differ significantly, for example, in approaching politics 
from the perspective of a comprehensive ethical theory. In doing so, it offers 
a different conception of deliberative democracy and shows how the chosen 
theory is limited by certain assumptions specific to its own context and that 
the understanding of deliberative democracy needs to be expanded and modi-
fied to approach genuine universalism.
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